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Constitutional Law—Use Taxes—Collection from Extrastate Vendors.—
Scripto, Inc. v. Carson.'--Plaintiff, a Georgia corporation, which had not
qualified to do business in Florida, and which had no office or other place
of business there, made sales of goods exclusively 2 through orders solicited in
that state pursuant to a contract with Florida wholesalers. 2 The contract pro-
vided that the wholesalers had no authority to make collections for the
corporation, and further that the parties intended to create the relationship
of independent contractor. All orders were sent directly to the corporation
in Georgia for acceptance or refusal and the wholesalers were to receive
a commission for all orders accepted. Plaintiff brought suit to enjoin a
threatened attachment of certain accounts receivable of plaintiff for the
satisfaction of a claim which had been assessed against the plaintiff by the
Florida Comptroller pursuant to a Florida statute making a vendor sec-
ondarily liable for failure to collect use taxes imposed upon the vendee as
primary obligee. The Supreme Court of Florida sustained a judgment
entered against the corporation.5 On appeal, the Supreme Court of the
United States affirmed. HELD: There is a sufficient nexus between the
corporation and Florida to justify the requirement that the corporation
serve as the state's tax collector.
That a state has the power to invoke a use tax on goods bought from
out-of-state vendors is now well settled. 5 The main issue with respect to
1 362 U.S. 207 (1960).
2 Scripto employed one salesman in Florida. However, the Florida courts found that
his presence was not relevant to the determination of the case.
3 The wholesalers handled Scripto products in conjunction with other manufac-
turers' products.
4 Fla. Stat. § 212.06 (1959). The pertinent provisions of this statute are:
"(1) The aforesaid tax at the rate of three per cent of the retail sales
price, as of the moment of sale, or three per cent of the cost price as of the mo-
ment of purchase, as the case may be, shall be collectible from all dealers herein
defined on the sale at retail, the use, the consumption, the distribution and the
storage for use of consumption in this state, of tangible personal property."
"(2) .	 (g) 'Dealer' also means and includes every person who solicits
business either by representatives or by the distribution of catalogs or other
advertising matter and by reason thereof receives and accepts orders from con-
sumers in the state, and such dealer shall collect the tax imposed by this chap-
ter from the purchaser and no action either in law or in equity on a sale or
transaction as provided by the terms of this chapter may be made in this
state by any such dealer unless it be affirmatively shown that the provisions of
this chapter have been fully complied with."
6 105 So. 2d 775 (Fla. i958).
6 A use tax is a tax on the privilege of using a product. It is a tax on the enjoy-
ment of that which was purchased and as such the product and taxable event are
deemed out of the flow of interstate commerce—therefore, subject to state taxation.
Compare General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission, 322 U.S. 335 (1944) with Mc-
Leod v. J. E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944). Both cases were handed down the
same day and the majority opinion in each was written by Mr. Justice Frankfurter.
For other cases upholding the validity of use taxes see, Nelson v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., 321 U.S. 373 (1941); Nelson v. Sears Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359 (1941);
Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 182 (1939); Southern Pacific Co. v.
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making an extrastate vendor a tax collector is whether or not there is
sufficient contact between the taxing state and the corporation as will give
the state a jurisdictional basis for such imposition. There must be some
definite link, some minimum connection between a state and the foreign
corporation it seeks to make its tax collector,' if the Due Process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment is to be satisfied.
In General Trading Co. v. State Tax Commission8 an extrastate cor-
poration, having no operations in the taxing state other than the solicitation
of orders by its own traveling salesmen, was held liable for the amount of a
use tax ordinarily imposed on the vendee but demandable from the vendor
as a collector for the public treasury. Active solicitation in the taxing state
by the out-of-state corporation's salesmen was deemed sufficient to supply
the necessary nexus. On the other hand, when Maryland had seized a
Delaware seller's truck as a means of realizing use taxes not collected by
the corporation, the Supreme Court in Miller Bros. v. Maryland,° held
Maryland's seizure invalid as a violation of due process. In that case the
foreign corporation did no active soliciting of orders and no accepting of
orders by mail or telephone. Numerous residents of Maryland went to
Delaware to purchase goods at appellant's place of business. Occasionally,
the corporation delivered the goods which were so purchased. It was on one
of these occasions that the truck was seized. The Supreme Court held that
although the Maryland residents are subject to the Maryland use tax on
goods purchased in Delaware and used in Maryland, there was no jurisdic-
tional basis for Maryland's requiring this Delaware corporation to collect the
use tax. Without active solicitation by the foreign corporation in Maryland
there was not a sufficient nexus between the two to subject the corporation
to this burden.
The Scripto case is a sort of hybrid falling in between General Trading
and Miller Bros. Scripto attempted to circumvent liability based upon the
principles as set out in the General Trading case by designating the whole-
salers as independent contractors. Apparently, Scripto felt that the Court
would draw the line at General Trading and hold that anything less than
active solicitation of orders by employee-salesmen would not subject an
out-of-state vendor to liability for failure to collect use taxes on goods it
sold. The Court met this argument head-on by stating that even though
the salesmen are not regular employees of Scripto devoting full time to the
company, the labeling of them as independent contractors is constitutionally
irrelevant.'0 Furthermore, the Court held that it is immaterial that the
Gallagher, 306 U.S. 167 (1939); Felt & Tarrant Mfg. Co. v. Gallagher, 306 U.S. 62
(1939); Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937).
7
 Miller Bros. v. Maryland, 347 U.S. 340 (1954); Scripto, Inc. v. Carson, supra
note 1.
8 322 U.S. 335 (1944).
9 Supra note 7.
10 362 U.S. at 211.
"The formal shift in the contractual tagging of the salesman as 'independent'
neither results in changing his local function of solicitation nor bears upon its
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wholesalers handled products other than Scripto's and thus were agents
for several principals." The sales and activities of the Florida wholesalers
were deemed to be a sufficient emanation of the corporation in Florida to
justify Florida's requirement that Scripto be its tax collector.
In the absence of any Congressional legislation' 2 prohibiting a state
from requiring an out-of-state vendor to be its tax collector in situations
where the contact between the two is slim, the Court must determine in
each case whether the minimum contact has been made so as not to be
violative of due process.' 3
 The test is "simply the nature and extent of
the activities"" of the corporation in the taxing state. The activities of
Script() through the Florida wholesalers were regular, systematic and pro-
ductive of a substantial flow of goods from Script() into Florida. The Court
was correct in not allowing these activities to be clouded by the tagging of
the Florida wholesalers as independent contractors.
PAUL L. BARRETT
Contracts—Conflict of Laws—Severability of Arbitration Clause.—
Commonwealth Oil Refining Co. v. Lummus Co.'—The Lummus Com-
pany is engaged in designing and constructing oil refineries. On the
basis of certain cost and profitability estimates by Lummus, the Common-
wealth Co. contracted in New York with Lummus in 1954 for the con-
struction of an oil refinery and again in 1956 for expansion of the
effectiveness in securing a substantial flow of goods into Florida.... To permit
such formal 'contractual shifts' to make a constitutional difference would open
the gates to a stampede of tax avoidance."
11 Id. at 211.
12 Congress can, of course, under its power to regulate commerce, enact legislation
which would deny a state the power to require a corporation engaged exclusively in
interstate commerce to become the state's tax collector when the only nexus between
the two is the active solicitation of sales by the corporation's agents. Legislation to
this effect was introduced in both Houses of Congress after the Scripto decision was
handed down. H.R. 12, 235, S. 3549, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. (1960).
13
 Although the amount of contact necessary to subject a foreign corporation to
the jurisdiction of the state for a valid "in personam" judgment in causes of action
arising out of the activities of the corporation within the state may not be co-extensive
with the minimum contact necessary to permit a state to require the foreign vendor to
be its tax collector, a close parallel between the two might be drawn. This is especially
so where the cause of action in the "in personam" suit is not based upon a tort involving
a dangerous instrumentality. Young v. Masci, 289 U.S. 253 (1933); Hess v. Pawloski,
274 U.S. 352 (1927). The test as promulgated in International Shoe Inc. v. Washington,
326 U.S. 310 (1945), for subjecting a foreign corporation to an "in personam" judgment
is whether or not there is a certain minimum contact between the state and the corpora-
tion so that "traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice" are not offended
if the corporation is to be required to defend a suit in the state where the cause of
action arose. This test, in substance, is also applied to situations wherein a court must
determine whether the Fourteenth Amendment has been violated when a state attempts
to make an extrastate corporation its tax collector.
14 362 U.S. at 212.
1 280 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1960).
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